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What are the limits to the defence of objective justification in age discrimination? A 
consideration of the recent cases of Woodcock v Cumbria PCT and Seldon v 
Clarkson Wright and Jakes. 
 
Age is the most recent addition to the list of characteristics protected by law and now 
contained within the Equality Act 2010; it is perhaps this newness that has promoted a 
plethora of judicial decisions relating to the interpretation of the defence – unique to direct 
age discrimination – of objective justification. But what are the limits, if any, to the 
defence? Have the courts in England and Wales and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) already gone too far in allowing objective justification as a defence and 
thereby diminished the protection of the law in this area? And can costs ever be used to 
justify age discrimination?  
In Woodcock v Cumbria Primary Care Trust [2012] EWCA Civ 330, Mr Woodcock, a 
former Chief Executive of the NHS Trust, appealed to the Court of Appeal when his action 
on the grounds that he suffered direct discrimination by way of less favourable treatment 
because of his age was not upheld, since the action of the Trust had been found to be 
objectively justified by a legitimate aim. His appeal was partly on the basis that cost saving 
could not a legitimate aim in justifying age discrimination. Certainly the parent EC Directive 
2000/78 appeared to permit only specific examples of defences to direct age 
discrimination, namely “legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational 
training objectives”, although the UK consultation papers on age discrimination suggested 
there could be other legitimate aims such as health, welfare and safety concerns and the 
particular training requirements of the job in question. The main criterion was that to be a 
legitimate aim, it had to correspond to a real need on the part of the employer, which could 
include cost. Can cost alone, however, justify direct age discrimination?  
The employer must show not only that he has a legitimate aim for his use of an age-based 
distinction, but must also show that the action was proportionate, that is that the use of the 
age factor was “appropriate and necessary”. Having a legitimate aim which is obtained by 
proportionate means constitutes the test of objective justification.  
The Supreme Court gave its decision in the case of Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes 
(A Partnership) [2012] UKSC 16 shortly after the Court of Appeal had delivered its 
judgment in Woodcock.  This case also concerned the scope for justifying discrimination 
on the grounds of age, although it differed from Woodcock in that it concerned mandatory 
contractual retirement ages which at the time of the incident in question were still 
potentially lawful. Lady Hale, giving the judgment of the Court, commented on the subject 
of what constitutes a ‘legitimate aim’ within Directive 2000/78, saying that these were 
social policy objectives and therefore distinguishable from reasons that related purely to 
the employer’s personal situation such as a desire for cost reduction, although accepted 
that a national rule may recognise that an employer would have a degree of flexibility. A 
number of legitimate aims have been recognised in various cases before the CJEU, 
including the efficient planning of the departure and recruitment of staff, promoting access 
for younger people, ensuring a mix of generations, rewarding experience and facilitating 
the participation of older people in the workplace, although none were concerned with cost 
saving for the employer. Lady Hale in Seldon categorised these as intergenerational 
fairness aims. The outcome of this case was the dismissal of Mr Seldon’s appeal against 
his enforced retirement from the firm of solicitors where he worked as a partner, as the 
aims identified by the firm (none of which were linked to cost) were found to be legitimate 
by the Supreme Court.  
Mr Woodcock was given his contractual period of twelve months notice of redundancy by 
his employer, Cumbria Primary Care Trust (PCT), just before his 49th birthday and before 
formal consultation had commenced. Had the PCT waited until after his birthday, he would 
have been able to continue to work until after the age of 50 and would therefore have 
received greatly enhanced pension benefits.  Woodcock’s comparator colleagues were 
formally consulted before notice of their redundancy was given and he considered that he 
had therefore been subjected to less favourable treatment because of his age. His claim 
failed in both the Employment Tribunal and the EAT, but went on to a further appeal in the 
Court of Appeal where it was confirmed that, even though the action of the PCT was 
directly discriminatory, there was a defence because, in certain limited circumstances, 
financial considerations could provide justification for what would otherwise constitute 
unlawful direct discrimination. 
This finding was in spite of the orthodox position taken by cases such as Cross and others 
v British Airways plc, UKEAT/0572/04, which was that considerations based on cost alone 
cannot justify treatment which is discriminatory on grounds of age. In his reserved 
judgment in Cross, Burton J (the then President of the EAT) gave the following 
observations in relation to certain decided cases that appeared to accept costs as 
justification for discriminatory treatment: 
It seems to us, as a matter of obvious common sense...that, albeit in the weighing exercise, 
costs justifications may often be valued less ...  economic justification such as the saving, 
or the non-expenditure, of costs...must be considered. 
Burton J referred to the case of Hill and Stapleton v The Revenue Commissioners and 
Department of Finance, C-243 95,  a case in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
considered an economic justification put forward by the employer for discriminating 
between full-time and part-time civil servants, in which the ECJ said: ‘So far as the 
justification based on economic grounds is concerned, it should be noted that an employer 
cannot justify discrimination arising from a job-sharing scheme solely on the ground that 
avoidance of such discrimination would involve increased costs.’ 
The European Court had not before used the word ‘solely’ in the context of rejecting cost 
as a justification for age discrimination, but used the same reasoning in the later cases of 
Kϋtzbauer [2003] IRLR 368 (ECJ) and Stienicke [2003] IRLR 892 (ECJ). Burton J 
concluded that, ‘A national state cannot rely on budgetary considerations to justify a 
discriminatory social policy. An employer seeking to justify a discriminatory PCP cannot 
rely solely on considerations of cost. He can however, put cost into the balance, together 
with other justifications if there are any.’ 
This meant that employers could apply the ‘cost plus’ principle to justification. The key 
question in Woodcock was essentially whether this was a cost-plus case, in other words 
that cost could only be considered to be a legitimate aim if linked to a non-cost factor. It 
was argued for Mr Woodcock that there was no apparent  ‘plus’, and that the aim in giving 
the dismissal notice when it did was simply an attempt to avoid costs that it would 
otherwise incur.  Nonetheless, Rimer, LJ, giving the decision of the Court, thought that 
there was ‘some degree of artificiality about such an approach to the question of 
justification’ since ‘almost every decision taken by the employer is going to have regard to 
costs.’ He went so far as to say that it would have been ‘irresponsible’ of the Trust to have 
acted otherwise, and dismissed the appeal. 
The question now is whether the courts have now gone too far now in accepting that cost 
considerations can be justification for direct age discrimination? In the Government 
consultations on the age regulations, it was stated that the test of objective justification 
would not be an easy one to satisfy. The cases hear by the European Court unequivocally 
show that cost considerations alone cannot be justification for age discrimination; the 
decision in Woodcock might, however, encourage employers in future to attempt to justify 
direct age discrimination on the basis of cost which will further erode the protection for 
workers from discrimination because of their age which, it is submitted, was not the 
original intention of the legislation. 
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